No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/02/01 : LOC-HAK-553-4-25-6

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DEC 1969

TOP SECRET/UMBRA

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: CIA Intelligence Memorandum: North Korea Changes Tactics Toward the South

Attached is an interesting CIA analysis of the significant change in North Korean tactics toward the South during the past year. The report indicates, inter alia, that:

-- Kim apparently has decided to emphasize propaganda and political subversion and stop armed harassment for the time being.

-- Among the many indicators in 1969 of this change were the marked decrease in incidents and casualties along the DMZ, reduction in personnel assigned to paramilitary and guerrilla forces, concentration of agent activities on political rather than paramilitary operations, and a shift in propaganda emphasis.

-- A major purge to reestablish Party control of the army provided the psychological groundwork and scapegoats for explaining the shift in tactics.

-- The change reflects greater realization that violence has not helped achieve unification. Journals still emphasize that force alone can be successful but also recognize that force will be productive only when the South Korean population is sympathetic and efforts are supported internationally.

-- North Korean brinkmanship has not generated sufficient international support and Peking and Moscow have been clearly reluctant to back the Korean effort. Pyongyang is now trying to project an image of respectability and obtain greater international acceptance.

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-- North Korea has apparently abandoned its earlier expectations of uniting Korea in the early 70's. Preparations seem designed to capitalize on a favorable turn of events rather than being keyed to a deliberate timetable for a march South.

It seems quite possible that the warning to Dobrynin may have played a role in the change of Kim's tactics to a less overt use of force.

Attachment

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